Chapter II of Foucault's The Care of the Self, 'The Cultivation of the Self,' is arguably one of the most controversial sections of the entire History of Sexuality. The diatribe over this chapter was initially mounted by Pierre Hadot's critical essay 'Reflections on the Idea of the 'Cultivation of the Self." Therein, Hadot objects to Foucault’s dissolution of the Stoic doctrinal antinomy between voluptas ('pleasure') and gaudium ('joy') and, thereby, to the relegation of the latter notion to the subordinate status (...) of 'another form of pleasure', on the one side, and of Seneca himself to the problematic rank of a sort of Epicurean on the other. The present investigation aims to unveil this aspect of the Foucault-Hadot querelle as only a pseudo-controversy engendered by Seneca recurring to two different terminological registers throughout his writings: the so-called verbum publicum and the significatio Stoica. (shrink)

This article challenges the recurrent critique that Pierre Hadot’s identification of ancient philosophy with the practice of spiritual exercises introduces a non- or irrational dimension into metaphilosophy. The occasion to do this is provided by Kerem Eksen’s recent reading of Descartes’s Meditations as consisting of solely intellectual, rather than spiritual, exercises—since the latter, Eksen claims, involve extrarational means and ends. Part 2 presents an alternative account of the role of cognition in the ancient meditatio at issue in understanding Descartes’s antecedents. (...) This account is indebted to Michel Foucault’s characterization of ancient meditation as involving two cognitive mechanisms: an appropriation of thought, and an experiment in identification. Part 3 argues that attempts such as Eksen’s to depict spiritual exercises as wholly noncognitive themselves are the product of an “unexamined Cartesianism” that is fundamentally at odds with the monistic psychology of ancient Stoics like Marcus Aurelius as discussed in Hadot’s studies. (shrink)

In the present contribution, the author contends, first, that “the perfect piece of Stoicism” that Emerson wanted to make out of Thoreau’s philosophical correspondence with his disciple Harrison Blake in Letters to Various Persons (1865) was neither concerned with a personality stereotype, as Sophia Thoreau feared, nor with the specifically Stoic way of living, as Richardson and Risinger have claimed in response. This first edition of Thoreau’s correspondence was in fact meant to be representative of that generally philosophical “art of (...) living well” to which Thoreau was entirely committed. Second, the author provides a comparative analysis of Thoreau’s philosophical letters to his pupil and Seneca’s epistolary with Lucilius, in order to ascertain precisely how Thoreau’s letter-writing itself, apart from Emerson’s framing of it, might have been informed by his knowledge and interest in Stoic epistolary practices. (shrink)

A corpus of 360 distinct early modern printed editions containing Johannes de Sacrobosco’s Tractatus de sphaera is “dissected” into a corpus of 540 text-parts, 241 of them re-occurring at least once. Through the exploration of the data, we recognized a relevant position for four anonymous authors in their social network. We demonstrate that the text-parts originally assigned to the anonymous authors were authored or edited by Georg Rheticus. By means of data analysis, we conclusively establish that Rheticus profoundly impacted (...) the content of such textbooks for the introductory class in geocentric astronomy all over Europe between 1538 and 1629. (shrink)

Recent theories on cognitive science have stressed the significance of moral intuition as a counter to and complementary part of moral reasoning in decision making. Thus, the aim of this paper is to create an integrated framework that can account for both intuitive and reflective cognitive processes, in order to explore the antecedents of ethical decision making. To do that, we build on Scholasticism, an important medieval school of thought from which descends the main pillars of the modern Catholic social (...) doctrine. Particularly, the focus will be on the scholastic concept of synderesis, which is an innate human faculty that constantly inclines decision makers toward universal moral principles. Managerial implications are discussed, stressing how a rediscovery of decision makers’ intuitive moral judgments could be relevant in the reflective thinking practice of managers’ ethical reasoning, thus saving them from rational insensitivity to ethical dilemmas. (shrink)

After achieving sustained graft functioning in animal studies, the next step in the progression of xenotransplantation towards clinical application is the initiation of the first clinical trials. This raises the question according to which criteria patients shall be selected for these trials. While the discussion regarding medical criteria has already commenced, ethical considerations must also be taken into account. This is essential, first, to establish a procedure that is ethically reasonable and justified. Second, it is a prerequisite for a publicly (...) acceptable and comprehensible implementation. This paper outlines a multicriteria approach for the selection of patients in first-in-human clinical trials of cardiac xenotransplantation with four ethical criteria: medical need, capacity to benefit, patient choice and compliance (as an exclusion criterion). Consequently, these criteria identify a primary target group of patients who exhibit a high medical need for cardiac xenotransplantation, face a high risk of morbidity and mortality without an organ replcaement therapy, have a substantial chance of benefiting from xenotransplantation, thereby also enhancing the scientific value of the trial, and qualify for an allotransplant to have a real choice between participating in a first-in-human xenotransplantation trial and waiting for a human organ. A secondary group would include patients for whom only the first two criteria are met, that is, who have a high medical need and a good capacity to benefit from xenotransplantation but who have a restricted choice because they do not qualify for an allotransplant. (shrink)

Isaac Levi is more interested in inquiry and how it progresses than he is in metaphysics. Questions concerning the role of disposition predicates in inquiry are more central to him than those concerning the nature and reality of dispositions. It has not stopped him from giving me and others very useful metaphysical advice. Currently, where empirical metaphysics is in vogue, there is every reason to see whether the two forms of philosophical interest might interlock substantially. Levi has stimulating ideas indeed (...) on the two forms of philosophical interest, and has recently summarized them in the slogan: “The reality of dispositions is a work in progress”. We can learn much about what kinds of dispositions are acceptable from tracing and comparing the histories of successful and less successful disposition predicates in scientific inquiry. Levi explores one route along which dispositions become real. His idea is that the introduction of dispositions facilitates covering law explanation by increasing the number of laws. The successful disposition predicate eventually becomes integrated in scientific theory, much like an ordinary theoretical term, whereas the unsuccessful does not. My impression is that Levi thinks that this is the only way a disposition can become real. To evaluate this claim, an alternative course suggested by Jon Elster is introduced. I then try to bring out the differences between Levi's and Elster's views on dispositions, partly by suggesting that they resemble two aspects of full explanations discussed by Wesley Salmon. But more about that below. (shrink)

Aim of the lectures -- Early Brahmanical literature -- Panini's grammar -- A passage from the Chandogya Upanisad -- The structures of languages -- The Buddhist contribution -- Vaisesika and language -- Verbal knowledge -- The contradictions of Nagarjuna -- The reactions of other thinkers -- Sarvastivada Samkhya -- The Agamasastra of Gaudapada -- Sankara -- Kashmiri Saivism -- Jainism -- Early Vaisesika -- Critiques of the existence of a thing before its arising -- Nyaya -- Mimamsa -- The Abhidharmakosa (...) bhasya of Vasubandhu -- The Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asanga and its bhasya -- Bhartrhari -- The problem of negation -- Dignaga and verbal knowledge -- The Bodhisattvabhumi -- Prajnakaragupta -- Indian thinkers and the correspondence principle -- Appendix. The Mahaprajnaparamitasastra and the Samkhya tanmatras. (shrink)

We are responsible for some things but not for others. In this thesis, I investigate what it takes for an entity to be responsible for something. This question has two components: agents and actions. I argue for a permissive view about agents. Entities such as groups or artificially intelligent systems may be agents in the sense required for responsibility. With respect to actions, I argue for a causal view. The relation in virtue of which agents are responsible for actions is (...) a causal one. I claim that responsibility requires causation and I develop a causal account of agency. This account is particularly apt for addressing the relationship between agency and moral responsibility and sheds light on the causal foundations of moral responsibility. (shrink)

0. Philippe Huneman and Charles T. Wolfe: Introduction 1. Tobias Cheung, “What is an ‘organism’? On the occurrence of a new term and its conceptual transformations 1680-1850” 2. Charles T. Wolfe, “Do organisms have an ontological status?” 3. John Symons, “The individuality of artifacts and organisms” 4. Thomas Pradeu, “What is an organism? An immunological answer” 5. Matteo Mossio & Alvaro Moreno, “Organisational closure in biological organisms” 6. Laura Nuño de la Rosa, “Becoming organisms. The organisation of development and (...) the development of organisation” 7. Denis Walsh, “Two Neo-Darwinisms” 8. Philippe Huneman, “Assessing the prospects for a return of organisms in evolutionary biology” 9. Johannes Martens, “Organisms in evolution” 10. Susan Oyama, “Biologists behaving badly: Vitalism and the language of language” . (shrink)

Anhand einer klinischen Vignette wird ausgeführt, dass das psychoanalytische Geschehen sich in mehreren Dimensionen entfaltet. Drei solcher Dimensionen – als Bedeutung (Erkenntnis), Berührung (Kontakt) und Bewegung (Ereignis) bezeichnet – werden beschrieben und deren dimensionale Charakteristik auf die Sinnesqualitäten des Sehens, des Berührungssinnes und des Hörens bezogen. Es wird gezeigt, dass sie Raum und Zeit auf je eigene Weise konstituieren und somit einander inkommensurable, durch keine logische oder dialektische Operation in eine Einheit überführbare Aprioritäten darstellen. Mit deren Unvereinbarkeit ist auch auf (...) Grenzen theoretisch-begrifflicher Bemächtigung verwiesen, womit die Frage nach der Reichweite metapsychologischer Begriffe, etwa des Begriffs des Unbewussten, aufgeworfen ist. Von hier aus wird in einem Ausblick nach der Begegnung als organisierendem Phantasma der analytischen Situation gefragt und – auf dem Weg einer Erörterung des Begegnungsbegriffs bei Martin Buber – versucht, Begegnung dimensional näher zu bestimmen. (shrink)

The thesis addresses the nature of causation. It is argued that causation exists and is as local as its causes and effects. As a consequence, the position advocated is contrary to the as yet prevailing view that no 'causal tie' between cause and effect exists. Moreover, it is suggested that this tie can be perceived. The essay attempts to elucidate the nature of causes, effects, and causal mechanisms. It is argued that they are facts rather than particulars or universals. Furthermore (...) it is suggested that these facts can be conceived of as tropes. Finally, in the light of this thesis a few traditional issues are discussed: what is the relation between causation and explanation? How should we conceive of causal laws? Does the idea of mechanisms with different degrees of reliability further our understanding of the determinism/indeterminism issue? (shrink)

According to Trawny, Heidegger’s Black Notebooks show that he turned away from any National Socialism in 1938 and that his thinking could be “contaminated” by National Socialism and anti-Semitism only between 1931 and 1944/1945. However, in this paper it is argued that already in Being and Time Heidegger had made a case for National Socialism; that he discovered in 1938 the “true” National Socialism, and that Trawny’s main criterion regarding Heidegger’s anti-Semitism is false. Heidegger’s case is compared with Max Scheler, (...) who, because of Hitler, turned from the right to the centre. In addition, alternatives to Trawny’s detailed interpretations of three of Heidegger’s anti-Semitic remarks are offered, it is shown that Trawny misconstrues Heidegger’s anti-Semitism, and the anti-Semitic aspects of Heidegger’s history of Being are presented. (shrink)

WHAT IS PRESENT TO THE MIND? Donald DAVIDSON The University of California at Berkeley There is a sense in which anything we think about is, ...

The paper suggests that consumers and their behaviors deserve more attention in our field. After a few website references and after a brief literature review of recent business ethics and consumer behavior literature conceptual frameworks are suggested. As an open end, the paper contains some empirical references, related to consumer honesty, tax loyalty and to motives for buying organic food, and suggests the development of a consumer morality measurement instrument.

Presque tous les interprètes considèrent qu’il va de soi qu’en Physique Β, 1, 192b8-193a9, Aristote présente ce qui constitue le cœur de sa propre théorie de la nature et des choses naturelles, par opposition à d’autres théories dont il avait connaissance. La question de savoir si, avec ses deux définitions, il renvoie à un principe actif, à un principe passif ou à quelque chose d’autre, a par ailleurs fait l’objet de discussions. Dans cet article, je cherche à montrer qu’en 192b8-193a9, (...) il ne met pas en place sa propre théorie, mais ne fait que préparer le terrain pour le déploiement d’une théorie, et qu’à l’évidence il renvoie à un principe actif, moteur. En outre, je montre comment il élabore au cours de Physique Β sa réponse à la question principale d’une théorie de la nature et des choses naturelles au niveau le plus général, et en quoi cette réponse est constitutive pour sa biologie. (shrink)

The philosophy of Christian Wolff is regarded to represent one of the most important schools of thought of the 18th century Enlightenment. The influence of this philosophy was based on a network of followers and disciples who propagated Wolff s work in the scholarly community and defended it against critics. This book, for the first time, explores the role of Ernst Christoph von Manteuffel. As imperial count, minister in the Cabinet of Poland Saxony and an agent of the Court of (...) Vienna, he was the decisive figure who initiated this network and led it for more than one and a half decades until his death in 1749. ". (shrink)

In a paper entitled “Emmanuel Faye: The Introduction of Fraud into Philosophy?”, Thomas Sheehan accuses Faye of committing many blunders in Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy. In this paper, I address what is according to Sheehan himself the most important part of his paper, namely his charges against Faye’s interpretation of Heidegger’s Being and Time. I show that they are all wholly unfounded. All the aspects of Being and Time that Sheehan addresses speak not only not against Faye (...) but rather even for Faye. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In social evolution theory, biological individuals are often represented on the model of rational agents, that is, as if they were ‘seeking’ to maximize their own reproductive success. In the 1990s, important criticisms of this mode of thinking were made by Brian Skyrms and Elliott Sober, who both argued that ‘rational agent’ models can lead to incorrect predictions when there are positive correlations between individuals’ phenotypes. In this article, I argue that one model of rational choice—namely, Savage’s model —can (...) actually be vindicated in evolutionary biology, provided that the pay-offs are computed in inclusive fitness terms. I also show that the use of this model is better avoided when pay-offs are non-additive, or when certain causal influences affect the outcome of natural selection. The result is a partial rehabilitation of this mode of thinking, conditional on both the additivity of the pay-off structure and the absence of any form of manipulation or coercion. _1_ Introduction _2_ When Natural Selection and Rational Deliberation Part Ways _3_ A Simple Solution: Redefining the Pay-offs in Inclusive Fitness Terms _4_ Sober on Inclusive Fitness Maximization _5_ Inclusive Fitness with Non-additive Pay-offs _6_ Causal Influences and the Savage– Hamilton Model _6.1_ Reciprocity and partner choice _6.2_ Coercion and manipulation _7_ Conclusion Appendix. (shrink)

The scientific and practical fields—especially high-performance sports—increasingly request a stronger focus be placed on individual athletes in human movement science research. Machine learning methods have shown efficacy in this context by identifying the unique movement patterns of individuals and distinguishing their intra-individual changes over time. The objective of this investigation is to analyze biomechanically described movement patterns during the fatigue-related accumulation process within a single training session of a high number of repeated executions of a ballistic sports movement—specifically, the frontal (...) foot kick (mae-geri) in karate—in expert athletes. The two leading research questions presented for consideration are (1) Can characteristics of individual movement patterns be observed throughout the entire training session despite continuous changes, i.e., even as fatigue-related processes increase? and (2) How do intra-individual movement patterns change as fatigue-related processes increase throughout a training session? Sixteen expert karatekas performed 606 frontal foot kicks directed toward an imaginary target. The kicks were performed in nine sets at 80% (K-80) of the self-experienced maximal intensity. In addition, six kicks at maximal intensity (K-100) were performed after each of the nine sets. Between the sets, the participants took a 90-s break. Three-dimensional full-body kinematic data of all kicks were recorded with 10 infrared cameras. The normalized waveforms of nine upper- and lower-body joint angles were classified using a supervised machine learning method (support vector machine). The results of the classification revealed a disjunct distinction between the kinematic movement patterns of individual athletes. The identification of unique movement patterns of individual athletes was independent of the intensity and the degree of fatigue-related processes. In other words, even with the accumulation of fatigue-related processes, the unique movement patterns of an individual athlete can be clearly identified. During the training session, changes in intra-individual movement patterns could also be detected, indicating the occurrence of adaptations in individual movement patterns throughout the fatigue-related accumulation process. The results suggest that these adaptations can be modeled in terms of changes in patterns rather than increasing variance. Practical consequences are critically discussed. (shrink)

Digitalisierung wird im vorliegenden Band aus der Theorieperspektive der Philosophischen Anthropologie Plessners betrachtet. Damit geht es im Kern darum, ob und inwieweit sich das Verhältnis von Mensch und Welt im Zeichen von Digitalisierung verändert. Die Verwendung unterschiedlicher Theoriefiguren, Thesen und Themenstellungen aus Plessners Werk erlaubt, die Vielfalt dessen, was mit Digitalisierung verbunden wird, zu systematisieren. Indem mit Plessner der Mensch verstanden wird als exzentrisch positionales Selbst, das Kognitives und Materiales verbindet, steht im Mittelpunkt, wie sich der Mensch eine Welt schafft, (...) die ihn selbst potentiell überformt. Gesellschaft, Autonomie, Technik, Stufen (im plessnerschen Sinne) und schliesslich der Mensch selbst sind die fünf Aspekte, die in den verschiedenen Beiträgen entfaltet werden: Was sind Charakteristika einer digitalen Gesellschaft? Geht die Epoche individueller Freiheit zu Ende? Was bedeutet Digitalisierung für die Autonomie des Menschen? In welches Verhältnis treten Mensch und Technik? Bringt Digitalisierung eine neue Stufe superior des Menschen hervor? Und wo bleibt der Mensch in der Digitalisierung?0. (shrink)

In der überarbeiteten Fassung seiner Wiener Dissertation von 1999 legt Rhoby (= R.) zunächst in einer sehr knappen Einleitung (19–23) eine Arbeitsdefinition des zentralen Begriffes einer geographischen ‚Reminiszenz‘ vor. Er gewinnt seine Definition primär aus dem ausgewerteten Material selbst. Bei Reminiszenzen handele es sich um „eine Erwähnung eines antiken Ortes, die innerhalb eines byzantinischen Textes nebenbei geschieht bzw. in einen längeren Handlungsablauf ergänzend eingearbeitet ist“ (19). Als bewußt hervorgeholte Erinnerung aus dem traditionellen literarischen Bildungsgut eines Autors hebt sich die Reminiszenz (...) von der Mimesis und dem Plagiat ab. Der Begriff bleibt jedoch bei R. etwas unbestimmt. Reminiszenz habe „eigentlich in jedem der folgenden Kapitel eine jeweils etwas andere Bedeutung“ (22). Auf die aktuelle Diskussion über Zitate, Anspielungen, Reminiszenzen und verwandte rhetorisch-stilistische Termini und Techniken in der Philologie, Literatur- und Kulturwissenschaft geht R. weder in seiner Einleitung (siehe 20 und Anm. 6) noch in der abschließenden Analyse (237–257) ausführlich ein. Für R.s Untersuchung bietet sich eine Vielzahl von Gattungen der mittel- und spätbyzantinischen Literatur als Textgrundlage an. Zu Recht schließt er Textsorten aus, in denen die Antike oder antike Themen ganz offen im Mittelpunkt stehen, z.B. Kommentare, Paraphrasen zu antiken Autoren, Progymnasmata und Übungsreden über antike Themen, auch den in der Antike spielenden byzantinischen Liebesroman. Denn in solchen Texten kann man offenkundig nicht von Reminiszenzen in R.s Verständnis sprechen. Es verbleiben aber weiterhin zahlreiche Werke aus verschiedenen Gattungen und von unterschiedlichen Autoren. Dies erschwert methodisch R.s Untersuchung. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

How to understand Brentano’s account of truth is a question of some controversy. A number of different views have been put forward as positions that Brentano held at some stage in his career. The received view has it that the early Brentano subscribed to a form of correspondence theory which he later rejected in favor of a definition of truth in terms of correct judging, where the correctness of a judgment is defined in terms of the notion of self-evidence (see (...) Kraus 1966, Szrednicki 1965, Stegmüller 1969, Kamitz 1983, Chrudzimski 2001). This fundamental shift in Brentano’s view is regarded as a change from an ontological to a “gnoseological”, i.e. epistemic, theory of truth (see Kastil 1934). Brentano’s mature view is sometimes said to resemble a neo-Kantian conception of truth or related views (see Kraus 1966, van der Schaar 1999, 2003), it has been compared with a coherence theory of truth (see Krantz 1990/91), and it is regarded as embracing a form of alethic anti-realism that places a substantial epistemic constraint on the concept of truth (see Künne 2003). More recently, Charles Parsons suggested that the early Brentano may also be regarded as a precursor of a deflationist theory of truth (see Parsons 2004). Following up on this proposal, the received view has been challenged by a new interpretation that ascribes to Brentano a deflationist position that he held throughout his career in combination with the view that truth pertains primarily to self-evident judgment (see Brandl forthcoming). Section 1 first summarizes the received view and then indicates two problems raised by this interpretation. Section 2 explains in which sense Brentano may have been a deflationist and how this interpretation avoids the problems of the received view. (shrink)